What is operational resilience testing under DORA?
Direct answer
DORA Chapter IV requires financial entities to maintain a digital operational resilience testing programme. This includes vulnerability assessments, network security testing, gap analysis, and software security reviews. Significant entities must also conduct threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) at least every three years, simulating real-world attacks against live production systems using threat intelligence.
TLPT must be performed by qualified testers and results reported to the National Competent Authority.
What must a DORA testing programme include?
Article 24(1) requires financial entities, other than microenterprises, to establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme as an integral part of the ICT risk management framework of Article 6. The same paragraph sets its purpose: assessing preparedness for handling ICT-related incidents, identifying weaknesses, deficiencies and gaps, and promptly implementing corrective measures.
The programme is risk-based. Article 24(3) asks you to take into account the evolving landscape of ICT risk, the specific risks your entity is or might be exposed to, and the criticality of information assets and of services provided. Article 25(1) then lists the kinds of tests the programme can draw on:
- vulnerability assessments and scans, and open source analyses;
- network security assessments and gap analyses;
- physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions;
- source code reviews where feasible;
- scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance testing and end-to-end testing;
- penetration testing.
The list is a range to choose from, not a checklist: the programme has to show which tests apply to which systems, and why.
Who tests, how often, and with whom?
The baseline cadence is in Article 24(6): at least yearly, appropriate tests on all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions. The list of critical or important functions is therefore the starting point of the programme (see what DORA requires).
Article 24(4) requires tests to be undertaken by independent parties, whether internal or external. An internal tester is allowed, but the entity must dedicate sufficient resources and make sure conflicts of interest are avoided throughout the design and execution phases of the test.
Two groups have their own rules. Central securities depositories and central counterparties must perform vulnerability assessments before any deployment or redeployment of new or existing applications, infrastructure components and ICT services supporting critical or important functions (Article 25(2)). Microenterprises still perform the Article 25(1) tests, combining a risk-based approach with strategic planning of ICT testing and balancing the resources and time they allocate against the urgency, type of risk and criticality involved (Article 25(3)).
On top of the programme, the financial entities that their competent authority identifies must carry out threat-led penetration testing at least every 3 years (Article 26(1)). The authority identifies them based on impact-related factors, possible financial stability concerns and their specific ICT risk profile and maturity (Article 26(8)). The detail is in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 and in What is TLPT under DORA?.
What happens to test findings?
Running the tests is only half of the requirement. Article 24(5) requires procedures and policies to prioritise, classify and remedy all issues revealed by the tests, and internal validation methodologies to ascertain that all identified weaknesses, deficiencies or gaps are fully addressed. A finding is closed when the fix has been validated, not when someone marks it done.
Test results also feed back into the wider framework. Article 6(5) requires the ICT risk management framework to be reviewed at least once a year, upon major ICT-related incidents, and following conclusions derived from digital operational resilience testing or audit processes. For threat-led penetration tests, Article 26(6) adds a formal close: once reports and remediation plans are agreed, the entity gives the authority a summary of the relevant findings, the remediation plans and the documentation showing the test met the requirements. The authority then provides an attestation (Article 26(7)).
Where do DORA testing programmes fall short?
- Tests are planned per system, without reference to critical or important functions, so the yearly coverage that Article 24(6) asks for cannot be shown.
- An annual penetration test is presented as the programme. Article 24(2) expects a range of assessments, tests, methodologies, practices and tools, chosen on risk.
- Internal testers run tests on systems their own team operates, which undermines the independence and conflict-of-interest safeguards of Article 24(4).
- Findings are fixed but never re-tested, so there is no evidence for the internal validation that Article 24(5) requires.
- Systems run by ICT third-party service providers are left out of scope, although they can support critical or important functions just as much as in-house systems.
How Acuna GRC handles it
In Acuna GRC, test findings are logged as issues in the Assure workspace, linked to the audit, requirement or control concerned, and closed through corrective actions that keep implementation apart from verification.
- Solution
DORA
Keep one ICT third-party register, map critical processes with RTO and RPO, find single points of failure and follow ICT incidents in one place.
- Core workspace
Assure
KPIs and measurements, reports, records, audits, issues and corrective actions.
- Core workspace
Operate
Risks and opportunities, threats, treatment plans, objectives, business impact analysis, tasks, the annual plan and documents.
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 6, 24, 25, 26 and 27
- Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 (RTS on threat-led penetration testing)
This page explains the rules in general terms and is not legal advice.
Frequently asked
Does DORA require a penetration test every year?
Not as such. Article 24(6) requires appropriate tests at least yearly on all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions, and penetration testing is one of the tests listed in Article 25(1). Threat-led penetration testing is a separate duty, at least every 3 years, for the entities the competent authority identifies.
Can our own security team run DORA tests?
Yes, if it is independent of what it tests. Article 24(4) allows internal testers when the entity dedicates sufficient resources and avoids conflicts of interest. For threat-led penetration testing the bar is higher: Article 27(2) requires authority approval and an external threat intelligence provider, Article 26(8) requires an external tester every three tests, and credit institutions classified as significant may only use external testers.
Do microenterprises have to test under DORA?
Yes, in a lighter form. Most Article 24 duties are written for entities other than microenterprises, and microenterprises are excluded from threat-led penetration testing, but Article 25(3) still requires them to perform the Article 25(1) tests, combining a risk-based approach with strategic planning of ICT testing.
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